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Beyond Convergence and the New Media Decision:
Regulatory Models in Communications Law
Melanie J. Mortensen†

Abstract

regard to the blurring of the distinction between carriage
and content. The second model explores the possibilities
involved in the present trend towards generalized regulatory convergence in communications, with its increased
reliance upon harmonized competition law and policy.
While this direction takes account of technological and
economic shifts, there is little attention to how public
interest or socio-political concerns may be adversely
affected by the trend. The third model, a multi-layered,
object-specific policy and regulatory regime, has been
proposed herein as an alternative that better accommodates recent shifts in communications due to convergence and competition. This model is recommended as
an alternative policy strategy whereby regulatory supervision and effective governance are available where appropriate. The purpose-specific model also best responds to
technological, economic, public interest and socio-political considerations, the balance of which should be considered a guide for adjudicating policy modifications in
such essential areas as communications technologies and
the information industry.

hile technological and economic changes have
been the most influential factors in stimulating
recent policy and regulatory reassessments in Canada
with respect to telecommunications and broadcasting
regulation, public interest and socio-political concerns
should also remain significant in the design of new regulatory and policy responses to convergence and competition. When the CRTC announced that it would refrain
from regulating broadcasting in new media for a period
of five years, this occasion illustrated the increasing inapplicability of the sector-specific legislation from which
the mandate of the CRTC is derived.
The first model addressed is the present sector-specific policy and regulatory treatment of communications,
which accommodates certain new pressures, such as
increased competition and privatization in the telecommunications sector, by using the power to forbear from
regulation. However, this route lacks appropriate treatment of technological innovations, particularly with
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[T]he phenomenon of convergence calls for complementary
analyses of the relations between the different, possibly competing, authorities which are today given the task of controlling the domains of telecommunications and of media separately. . . . [T]he institutional convergence could be a chance
for a real taking into account of the complexity of the
technological convergence whose treatment could as such
escape specialised authorities which remain distinct. 1

Introduction
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echnological convergence, privatization and
increased competition have led to new challenges
for communications law in the last decade. Consequent
changes in the telecommunications and broadcasting
sectors have given rise to doubts regarding the rationale
for sector-specific legislation. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC),
which provides the policy guidance and implementation
of the laws that govern communications technologies in
Canada, recently issued a significant decision regarding
new media undertakings, exempting them from regulation for five years. When combined with the erosion of
the boundary between telecommunications and broadcasting, as well as the increasing reliance upon competition law to govern where the CRTC has forborne from
regulation, the five-year abstention from regulation with
respect to the new media illustrates a fundamental
problem that exists with respect to the regulatory framework for communications in Canada in light of the parallel phenomena of convergence and competition.
To address this problem, three regulatory models
are assessed in this paper to determine their relative
success in meeting the challenges of convergence that
arise in the context of the potential regulation of new
media in Canada. The first is the present sector-specific
demarcation between telecommunications and broadcasting, with its trend toward forbearance in the areas
that are gradually being privatized. The second is the
convergence model, which emphasizes competition; in
many ways, the economic aspects of this model are currently being incorporated in the existing sector-specific
regulatory model. The third is a multi-layered, or objectspecific, regulatory regime. This paper recommends the
latter model, as it provides a focus that is missing in
policy debates emphasizing convergence. Furthermore, it
more ably accommodates the various challenges raised
by the phenomena of convergence and competition.
Indeed, regulatory and policy turbulence is not
unique to Canada. Different nations and communities of
nations are similarly in the process of adjusting to, first,
the technological changes of converging, emergent technologies; second, the requirements of international trade
commitments; and, third, the rise in competition and
privatization of the telecommunications sector. The
object-specific, multi-layer regulatory model is more
adaptable to the international commitments to which
Canada is a signatory. At the same time, it provides more
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explicit guidance for industry stakeholders. Finally, the
social and cultural significance of communications technologies require that regulatory models be adaptable to
particular needs of users. The multi-layer regulatory
model implements a context for the regulation that transcends simple economic factors, while also being more
responsive than the present content regulation in broadcast law. New media undertakings and the privatization
of regulated industries in telecommunications and
broadcasting contribute to a highly dynamic environment in the development of new policy and regulatory
strategies. This paper’s assessment of the three regulatory
models in view of technological, economic, public
interest, and socio-political considerations demonstrates
that the flexible and responsive multi-layer model provides an appealing alternative to current trends in the
policy and regulation of communications in Canada.

Policy Instability in the Current
Communications Regulatory
Environment

T

he regulatory environment for communications
typically develops in response to a variety of stimuli
and challenges. These influences may be classified by
four broad categories: (1) technological, (2) economic, (3)
public interest, and (4) socio-political. Shifts in regulatory
policy have thus traditionally occurred when one of
these elements has changed in an evident way. Furthermore, regional differences in the amalgamation of influences help account for the legitimate distinctions in
communications regulatory policy from nation to
nation.
At present, the four categories of influences are in
flux on a global scale, but with different concentration
and emphases. Technological innovation and the convergence of media and carrier abilities are shifting the
field with respect to communications and making
former sector-specific regulatory distinctions increasingly
redundant. The global move toward privatization and
competition in the provision of telecommunications is
shifting the economic field and rationale for regulation.
Thus, where there had been controlled monopolies in
the provision of telecommunications services, there is
now deregulation, with an increased dependency upon
competition law to make up for the shortcomings of the
privatized sector. Members of the public are involved in
these changes both as consumers and as potential participants in the policy development process. The public
interest and the notion of universal access are significant
factors in the regulatory policy of many nations, but
these concepts are increasingly overlooked in the move
toward the increasingly market-based treatment of telecommunications, as William Melody indicates:
There are two primary perspectives that require representation in policy debates, but that in most cases are absent. One
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is the perspective of those groups in society that may be
significantly affected by the policies adopted, but who do
not have a sufficiently organized financial vested interest to
mount a representation.. . . The second perspective is that of
society as a whole, focusing directly on the overall structure
of benefits, costs, and consequences for society. This perspective would examine these consequences that lie outside the
normal realm of special interest decision makers and would
include an evaluation of economic externality, social and
cultural consequences of policy options. 2

The socio-political field is thus shifting as international agreements and transnational bodies develop
increased authority over the implementation of communications. Indeed, we may therefore understand that
‘‘what is missing from these discussions . . . is a conception of how the regulatory changes, given the technological shift, will affect democratic values shared by many of
the countries posed with the regulatory quandaries of
convergence’’. 3 Simultaneously, previously less connected developing nations are joining the international
communications infrastructures, which forces attention
on the disparity in requirements and puts into question
the rationale for capitalist models of communications
service provision. 4 Regulatory shifts respond to particular
alterations in the balance of the four categories of influences. Responsive and responsible communications
policy requires the accommodation of technological,
economic, public interest, and socio-political influences
in the changes to, or development of, regulation, even if
there is no apparent shift to cause concern about any
particular one category of influence.
The regulation of telecommunications and broadcasting in Canada, as elsewhere, has developed from the
relation of the industry players and service providers, the
government, and the public in response to how the four
categories of influences were perceived. The concomitant phenomena of convergence and competition have
garnered much attention from regulators in Canada, as
in other nations. There is a move toward uniformity and
harmonization in the regulation of communications as
well as competition law. Nevertheless, as with most
other nations, the situation in Canada remains unique
with respect to the particular balance of influences. The
present attention to mainly technological and economic
influences in the present shifts in regulatory policy in
Canada reflects the fact that such shifts are perceived as
having little to do with the Canadian public interest or
the socio-political situation, as these have only changed
minimally in relation to the provision of communications services in recent years. Clearly, the shifts of influences in Canada are not identical to those of other
nations. In developed nations such as the Western European states, for instance, there is a different balance of
prominent influences than in Canada since their sociopolitical shifts with the European Union are altering the
political field. Similarly, different influences are evident
in certain developing nations as the public develops new
relations to communications with increased access to
basic communications services. Despite the different
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combinations of prominent influences, each of the influences should be included when new regulatory policy is
developed, or old regulatory policies are refurbished, to
ensure that the balance of responses is maintained, even
if particular influences have not shifted and would therefore appear less relevant to regulators. 5 This paper shall
therefore assess the three different regulatory and policy
models to determine their relative advantages and disadvantages in treating technological, economic, public
interest, and socio-political concerns.

Regulation of Communications in Canada
Canadian communications are managed and supervised by the CRTC. The governing legislation is presently arranged according to a sector-specific model that
divides the carriage and content of communications as
telecommunications and broadcasting, respectively. The
CRTC is a Canadian independent tribunal created in
1976 6 to ensure compliance with the Canadian Telecommunications Act 7 and Broadcasting Act. 8 These statutes are the responsibility of separate Ministries: Industry
Canada is responsible for the Telecommunications Act,
while Heritage Canada is responsible for the Broadcasting Act. The overlapping jurisdiction of the traditional split between carriage and content of information
in the era of convergence makes it particularly advantageous to have a single regulator, even though the CRTC
has traditionally had a division in its operations. The
CRTC is presently restructuring its operations in order
to more effectively respond to the new requirements of
convergence in the regulated undertakings that it oversees. Indeed, the change of the governance of telecommunications and the creation of the CRTC in the midseventies demonstrates the recognition by the government that there was a close relation between carriage
and content in a ‘‘communications system’’. 9 Furthermore, the CRTC has an important role with respect to
Canada’s trade commitments since its existence satisfies
the requirement of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) for an independent tribunal to render policy
with respect to telecommunications services.
Various principles guide the policy choices of the
CRTC with respect to its decisions and actions. In general, these principles are commensurate with all of the
categories of influences discussed above. The telecommunications and broadcasting policies for Canada are
statutorily enacted by section 7 of the Telecommunications Act 10 and section 3 of the Broadcasting Act. 11 The
notable objectives of the Telecommunications Act policy
include: orderly development, reliability, accessibility,
efficiency, national and international competitiveness,
Canadian ownership and control, use of Canadian facilities, innovation, users’ socio-economic status, and personal privacy protection. The main principles included
in the declaration of policy of the Broadcasting Act are:
Canadian ownership and control, essential public service
for national identity and cultural sovereignty, separate

102

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

English and French language broadcasting, the affirmation of various aspects of Canadian attitudes, Canadian
content, high standards, and regulation and supervision
by a single independent public authority. The references
to Canadian values or attitudes in the policy are specifically explicated at subsection 3(d) of the Broadcasting
Act:
(d) the Canadian broadcasting system should
(i) serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of
Canada,
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(ii) encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing a wide range of programming
that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas,
values and artistic creativity, by displaying Canadian talent in entertainment programming and
by offering information and analysis concerning
Canada and other countries from a Canadian
point of view,
(iii) through its programming and the employment
opportunities arising out of its operations, serve
the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men,
women and children, including equal rights, the
linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society and the special
place of aboriginal peoples within that society,
and
(iv) be readily adaptable to scientific and technological change [. . .]

Thus, in the enunciation of the Canadian telecommunications and broadcasting policies, all four of the
categories of influences are evident since technological,
economic, public interest, and socio-political factors are
included insofar as they are relevant to each sector.
At the international level, a number of international
trade commitments affect how the information industry
is governed. Canada is bound with respect to intellectual
property protection as well as certain aspects of telecommunications regulation by the TRIPs, 12 FTA, 13 NAFTA, 14
GATS, 15 and BTA. 16 Furthermore, with respect to the
‘‘old’’ telecommunications and broadcasting technologies, there are several long-standing agreements in place
that regulate and assist in the control of such media as
radio, telephones and television signals. 17
The CRTC’s ‘‘New Media Report’’ 18 was a policy
statement on both telecommunications and broadcasting that followed public consultation on the regulation of new media. ‘‘New media’’ was treated quite
simply as a catch-all for new media undertakings that
primarily involved the provision of services over the
Internet. The CRTC subsequently issued an exemption
order, the ‘‘New Media Decision’’, for new media broadcasting undertakings that indicated that broadcasting
regulation would not apply to new media undertakings. 19 Since the CRTC has a policy of reviewing its
decisions every five years, and decided it would not be
appropriate to review sooner in these circumstances, it
follows that new media undertakings are exempt from
broadcast regulations from the date of December 17th,

1999 until 2004. 20 The New Media Decision demonstrates certain shortcomings in the present sector-specific
regulatory scheme of telecommunications and broadcasting. 21 The relative flexibility of the New Media Decision with respect to future policy directions provides an
opportunity to demonstrate how different regulatory
models could manage the pressures that technological
innovations and transformations in economic strategies
have put on converging, privatizing, and increasingly
competitive communications industry participants.
Recent developments have demonstrated the difficulty presented by the lacunae in the regulation. After
the issuance of the New Media Decision, certain Canadian companies began operating Internet sites at which
television signals were retransmitted. One such company, Jumptv.com Canada Inc. (JumpTV), had applied
for a licence to do so under the compulsory licence to
retransmit television signals provided by section 31 of
the Copyright Act, 22 while the activities of JumpTV
seemed to fit the criteria for the CRTC’s exemption from
regulation for new media. Following significant pressure
within Canada and from the United States by cable
television organizations and major content producers, as
well as a public consultation process on the topic of
Internet retransmission, the federal government’s Bill
C-11, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, received royal
assent on December 12th, 2002. 23 The amendment of
section 31 of the Copyright Act provided thereby effectively presented a sector-specific exclusion from the compulsory licensing regime by explicitly excluding new
media retransmitters from the definition of ‘‘retransmitter’’.
After the passage of Bill C-11, the CRTC issued its
Broadcasting Public Notice 2003-2, 24 which revisited the
New Media Decision in light of the amendment. The
Internet Retransmission Notice indicated the position of
the CRTC with respect to the specific topic of Internet
retransmission of television signals:
[T]he Commission does not consider it necessary or appropriate to require the licensing of Internet retransmitters.
Rather, Internet retransmission undertakings should remain
exempt from these and from other requirements under Part
II of the Broadcasting Act. In addition, since the recent
amendments to the Copyright Act address the main concern identified in this proceeding, the Commission sees no
need to amend the New Media Exemption Order at this
time. 25

Thus, while the exemption continued with respect
to communications law, the alteration of the governance
of the intellectual property rights through a sector-specific solution provided a means by which the legislators
were able to circumvent the implications of regulating
the Internet through communications law. The sectorspecific nature of the exemption, however, in the legislation of intellectual property rights, may set a dubious
precedent from the perspective of intellectual property
theory. 26

Regulatory Models in Communications Law

New Media and Alternative
Policy and Regulatory Models for
Communications
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hree different models of policy and regulatory strategies present alternatives for treating communications in the current climate of technological innovation.
Each of these three models will be described in relation
to its current implementation and reception in communications policy doctrine. A practical description of how
the new media would be regulated according to each
model demonstrates the degree to which each model
assures that the categories of technological, economic,
public interest, and socio-political concerns are accommodated. The first model is the current, sector-specific
treatment of communications in policy and law that
divides broadcasting and telecommunications. It demonstrates a moderate degree of success in accommodating
the concerns as they have been assured in the past, but is
weak with respect to the attention to technological influences. The second model reflects current trends in communications deregulation, emphasizing the convergence
that blurs the distinction between broadcasting and telecommunications, and looks to greater competition in a
commercialized communications sector. It demonstrates
flexibility with respect to technological and economic
concerns, but is weak in the areas of public interest and,
especially, socio-political concerns. The third model is
based on theoretical proposals that would take communications policy in a different direction than current
trends and would instead be based on purpose-specific
regulation. The third model is recommended since it
facilitates the flexible, yet balanced accommodation of
the four categories of influences, allows for competition
where appropriate, and is more versatile with respect to
the public interest and socio-political influences when
different communications requirements create unique
policy and regulatory environments.

Regulatory Model One: Sector-Specific
Legislation and the Status Quo
The regulatory model presently used in Canada is
sector-specific legislation, which creates a distinction
between telecommunications and broadcasting. While
some jurisdictions collapse the two, the underlying discrete treatments of carriage and content often subsist. It
is important to note that even though convergence and
the greater privatization and commercialization of telecommunications and broadcasting are taking effect in
Canada, as yet there has been no true shift away from
this regulatory model. Instead, there has been an increase
by the CRTC in forbearing from regulation where it is
deemed appropriate. It is clear that the present delineation of communications law has been regarded as less
tenable given the last decade of technological developments and likely future innovations in communications.
The maintenance of the same system despite technological shifts, particularly when viewed in combination with
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the regulatory response of the reliance upon forbearance
to implement competition and the partnership with the
Competition Bureau, fails to address the growing unsuitability of sector-specific laws in the context of convergence.
Technological changes are making the sector-specific legislation obsolete because the distinctions
between telecommunications and broadcasting activities
and undertakings are growing less distinct. At the same
time, there is a push toward privatization of communications markets, particularly as the industry players are
similarly engaged in business convergence in order to
better compete. Thus, the rise in competition and privatization draws attention away from the fundamental
changes that have been occurring in communications, as
it is made to appear to be simply an evolution in the
technology in a field that is now, therefore, ready for
competition. 27 The substantive preservation of the content/carriage model does not accommodate the kinds of
policy considerations that arise with the shift in significance of communications technologies. It is true that this
regulatory model was certainly representative, at one
time, of the reality of certain kinds of information transmission; their attendant policies addressed the concerns
that arose with the significance of each branch to economic stakeholders and the public. New kinds of communications technologies give rise to new relations
among the public, the technologies, and the manner by
which information is transmitted, carried, processed, and
received.
While the CRTC made definitive policy statements
on convergence, its New Media Decision demonstrated
a unique stopgap procedure. By effectively indicating it
would ‘‘wait and see’’, the CRTC provided itself with
time to shift its policies and procedures to respond to the
industry and international pressures brought about by
technological convergence and the demand for industry
competition. Indeed, the New Media Decision is particularly instructive since it reflects the sector-specific division and the CRTC’s recognition of the effect of technological convergence and the insufficiency, or perhaps
growing inadequacy, of the sector-specific communications laws.
With respect to telecommunications, the following
description of the New Media Decision underscores this
difficulty:
Noteworthy for telecommunications purposes, the CRTC
confirmed in the Report on New Media that Internet Service Providers (‘‘ISPs’’) are not required to own or operate
their own transmission facilities in order to provide Internet
services. ISPs operating in Canada thus continue to have the
choice to offer Internet services using transmission facilities
leased from other carriers, or to build or purchase their own
transmission facilities. An ISP that does the former is analogous to a ‘‘reseller’’ and is not subject to direct CRTC regulation, whereas an ISP which owns or operates transmission
facilities would have the status of a telecommunications
common carrier and be subject to the Canadian ownership
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requirements and other forms of direct CRTC regulation
under the Telecommunications Act. 28

By contrast, the New Media Decision made the
following distinctions with respect to broadcasting:
(i) predominantly alphanumeric services, (ii) ‘‘customizable
content’’ (i.e. content allowing end-users to create their own
uniquely tailored content), and (iii) other content. The
CRTC concluded that material in categories (i) and (ii) is
not broadcasting, whereas material in content (iii) does fall
within the definition of broadcasting. The CRTC determined that new media content on the Internet that is
broadcasting should be exempted from regulation under
section 9(4) of the Broadcasting Act on the basis that regulation would not contribute to the achievement of the Broadcasting Act policy objectives. 29
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The CRTC based its decision on its findings that
significant Canadian new media content exists on the
Internet, that there is no evidence of a problem
regarding the visibility of Canadian new media content,
and that the new media industry is taking steps to ensure
the continued strong Canadian presence on the
Internet. 30 Nevertheless, these changes do not alter the
fact that the sector-specific legislation may in fact be
unsuitable to current and possible innovations in communications.
The framework characterized by sector-specific legislation and an increasing dependency on the power to
forbear from regulation performs somewhat adequately
with respect to public interest and socio-political factors.
It also facilitates economic growth by competition where
it does not regulate, but fails to adequately respond to
technological changes. By relying upon increasingly outdated distinctions, the sector-specific regulatory scheme
fails to provide a flexible response to the increasingly
interactive and technologically advanced communications environment. With respect to economic factors, the
sector-specific model incorporates the rise in privatization and competition in two ways: by forbearance from
regulation and the reliance upon competition law to
police market abuse. While this permits a certain
amount of flexibility to the industry participants, it
requires the arduous process of applying for forbearance
where the regulations are presently applicable. On the
other hand, new media undertakings that are presently
exempt from regulation face a regulatory lacuna that will
become increasingly significant as the end of the fiveyear period of exemption draws to a close. This situation
has not yet been remedied. With respect to both the
public interest and socio-political considerations, the present policies in the sector-specific regulation provide adequate protection. Where there has been forbearance
from regulation, on the other hand, such policy may not
be so easily imposed.

Regulatory Model Two: Convergence and
Competition
Changes in technology have given rise to most of
the legislative shifts in communications law and policy
in the past. At present, the rise in convergence and the
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introduction of different and new ways of transporting
and transmitting communications have created a turbulent situation regarding various policy developments.
The growing obscurity of the distinction between content and carriage renders the legislative differentiation
between broadcasting and telecommunications meaningless. 31 It has been suggested by some, such as Bernard
Clements, that a single, general communications regulatory model should therefore be developed:
An instinctive approach might be to create a new category
of ‘‘multimedia’’ services for which a suitable regulatory
framework could be devised.. . . [I]f a regulatory approach
cannot be developed in isolation of current frameworks,
there is a danger that existing regulation might be extended
inappropriately to the new environment. One solution
might be to take a completely fresh approach, with provisions for migrating from today’s regulatory framework to a
future unified regime. 32

Furthermore, it has also been argued that the rise in
competition makes the regulation of the communications industry unnecessary, and shifts the responsibility
of governance to competition law. 33 Concerns about this
trend often arise in telecommunication policy analyses,
such as the following observations by Colin Scott:
Increasingly, there is pressure to treat telecommunications
for regulatory purposes as part of the broader information
society apparatus, attempting to develop common regimes
for the economic and content regulations aspects of broadcasting, computing and telecommunications. Most general
is the broadly characterized shift from detailed sectoral rules
to broad competition/antitrust rules as the basis for regulation. 34

This single communications regulatory model
would therefore likely follow the present trend in communications and facilitate greater privatization and competition. It would determine the circumstances by which
regulation would be deemed necessary, and move
toward a greater deregulation of much of the communications industry.
Clearly, competition law is another area of law that
is becoming more important in this era of convergence
in communications technologies. The shift toward competition is definitely under way, which places Canada in
a transitional position with respect to the CRTC’s regulation of telecommunications and the Competition
Bureau’s jurisdiction over the open market. 35 The Competition Act 36 identifies the practices that are subject to
review by the Competition Tribunal, ‘‘notably the abuse
of a dominant position and entering into anti-competitive mergers’’. 37 There are important distinctions
between the sector-specific legislation that governs telecommunications as discussed above and the ‘‘technologically neutral’’ competition law. 38 Competition law does
not have the same kinds of policy objectives as those
espoused in the Telecommunications Act. Instead, the
Competition Act is intended to ‘‘assist in the restoration
of competitive conditions’’ where markets are monopoly
or oligopoly, and to prevent anti-competitive acts, or the
abuse of market power. 39 It has been noted that competi-
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tion law is appropriate to governing ‘‘a highly dynamic
telecommunications industry’’ since it is not based on
eroding technological distinctions and so would likely
be very active in the emerging communications
system. 40
The converged regulatory model provides certain
benefits, particularly in comparison to the sector-specific
legislation. The notional basis of the legislation would be
more adaptable to the kinds of innovations that may
arise in communications: ‘‘Regulatory dichotomies work
best when technological categories remain discrete and
absolute . . . [but] they surely do not work when technological convergence results in porous service categories
and diversification by operators’’. 41 With respect to technological problems that are raised by convergence, it has
been suggested that the problem of ‘‘bottlenecks’’, for
instance, could be suitably regulated by self-regulation
within the industry in concert with competition policy.
The move toward a market-based scheme may stimulate
greater innovation and allow a more efficient international environment for a uniform system of telecommunications service provision. 42 The reduction of national
regulation in the field of communications may create
more consistency internationally as it reduces the possibility of contradictory rules. Indeed, this has been suggested as one of the positive consequences of deregulation in telecommunications.
Furthermore, much recent speculation has considered the possible international application of competition law, and whether multilateral trade agreements
impose competition law principles upon their signatories. The Canada 1999 OECD Competition Report indicates that the Competition Bureau has been active in a
WTO working group ‘‘examining the interaction
between trade and competition policy’’:
Rather than continue with the ad hoc approach to competition policy reflected in recent WTO agreements, the Bureau
has been active in examining the viability of establishing a
sound multilateral framework at the WTO which will
advance competition policy internationally. Roundtable discussions with domestic stakeholders on the internationalization of competition policy were conducted by the Economics and International Affairs Branch of the Bureau. 43

The near future will thus likely see a cooperative
trans-national framework for negotiating core competition law principles, or a broad set of minimum requirements that are established for the regulation of international competition law problems. 44 This would be useful
once the competition in communications law becomes
more stable and established:
[T]he importance of cross-sector cooperation in both policymaking and regulation should not be overestimated. In a
nutshell, the best response to technological convergence
may be for regulators themselves to converge, across
national borders and, more importantly, across industry sectors. The goal of regulatory convergence should not be
homogenization but rather harmonization. Regulatory
responses should produce an agreeable harmony, not a set
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of identical responses. At the same time, competition policy
must not be viewed as a cure-all capable of permanent
solutions. The WTO cannot expect competition principles
that may be developed for audio-visual services, or for any
other convergence-related sector, to have immediate and
profound effects on competition throughout the converging
industries. 45

Nevertheless, there are also drawbacks to this regulatory model. Since the legislation would no longer be
sector-specific, it would be necessary to ensure that it
would be adaptable to new and emerging communications technologies and information transmission media.
At present, the CRTC is implementing changes in
response to technological convergence that reflect the
regulatory shifts that are required to accommodate innovations in communications. The changes in the CRTC
structure itself provide encouragement to those commentators who recommend moving toward a unified
regulatory model. Also, the New Media Decision demonstrates the rising indeterminacy of the telecommunications and broadcasting distinction where the application of the regulation is forborne. With the approach of
the New Media Decision’s expiry date — though it may
be renewed — a legislative solution to the problems
raised by technological convergence would ideally be
ready to be harmoniously implemented in the framework of Canadian communications. As demonstrated by
the Public Notice regarding Internet retransmission discussed above, the implementation of certain regulatory
responses to convergence in communications technologies may arise from the confluence and intersection of
other laws such as those that govern intellectual property
rights. Nevertheless, such re-regulation may work to circumvent the application of the stated policy objectives in
communications law.
The comprehensive viewpoint allowed by the analysis of this particular regulatory model according to the
technological, economic, public interest and socio-political considerations indicates that while the competition
model responds to certain technological and economic
concerns, it is weak with respect to public interest and
socio-political concerns. Accordingly, there are two significant elements that are relevant with respect to the
policy factors that enter into the reliance upon competition in the regulation of communications. In the sectorspecific legislation, the enumerated policy in each of the
Telecommunication Act and the Broadcasting Act had
similar values at base, but were suited to the kinds of
considerations that would be relevant to the particular
sectors. While any treatment of communications in law
would certainly include policy considerations that protected the fundamental values of universal access and the
promulgation of Canadian identity and values, the
greater abstention from regulation in favour of competition makes it seem less likely that such principles would
be effectively upheld.
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Regulatory Model Three: Object-Specific,
Multi-Layered Regulation
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In contrast to the present trend in communications
law that is moving toward the synthesis of telecommunications and broadcasting, with a greater reliance on competition law, another model is proposed herein that may
serve more specific purposes. A multi-layered regulatory
model alters the sector-specific view of communications
law by changing the focus of the delineation. The traditional split of telecommunications and broadcasting
reflects the relation between technologies and communications. Telecommunications refers to the carriage of the
communications; broadcasting refers to the content of
the communications. The multi-layered model, on the
other hand, responds to convergence in a more complex
way than simply proposing the synthesis of the two
modes. It is true that the effects of technological convergence confound the traditional split of carriage and content, but this does not mean that the transmission of
information should be identically regulated since essential distinctions remain with respect to their purposes,
whether for infrastructure, interconnection, or consumer
uses.
The discussion of multi-layered models by Jan van
Cuilenburg and Pascal Verhoest emphasises the variety
of policy and regulatory responses that may be explored
as alternatives in the regulation of convergence in technologies and the changes that are occurring in telecommunications. 46 The authors point to and critique the
three-layer model proposed by the European Green
Paper on Convergence. 47 This three-layer schema of the
telecommunications market makes the following
delineation: (1) infrastructures; (2) carriers; and (3) applications. It marks a departure from viewing telecommunications as simply infrastructure and applications, as had
been common in Europe at the start of the liberalization
of telecommunications. Responding to convergence and
competition, the three-layer model was originally
advanced in a study for the Dutch government in 1990:
‘‘This model combines the idea of different layers within
communication with the notion that content provision
and exchange is the finality of any telecommunications
service’’. 48 Cuilenburg and Verhoest go further to suggest
that a five-layer model would be more effective. The
three-layer European model is modulated by including
interoperability at two levels of interfaces, so that the
layers are: (1) infrastructures; (2) network interfaces; (3)
carriers; (4) user interfaces; and (5) applications. 49
By breaking down the telecommunications model
and allowing for the incorporation of what is now separately treated as broadcasting, the multi-layer model permits appropriate treatment for the different purposes of
the communications services that are provided by the
industry participants. This may be accomplished by creating legislation that treats the purpose or object of particular services, providing guidelines by which services
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may be deemed as (1) essential and therefore worthy of
rigorous regulation and control, which would correspond to the infrastructure and interface levels of the
five-layer model proposed by Cuilenburg and Verhoest;
(2) consumer-directed applications, which would be
open to a certain amount of regulation with respect to
what is presently referred to as ‘‘content’’ regulation, yet
which may in fact be implemented at a self-regulatory
level, and competition with respect to the provision of
the services; and (3) information transfer services, which
would be more open to deregulation and competition,
and which could correspond to carriers and user interfaces in the five-layer model described above. However,
this breakdown is simply provided as an example of the
versatility that should arguably be accorded to appropriate levels of supervision and control based on an
appropriate assessment of the technological, economic,
public interest and socio-political considerations that are
relevant in a particular jurisdiction or regulatory regime.
Various benefits flow from this kind of regulatory
and policy framework. Appropriate solutions could be
crafted that are adequately flexible so as to accommodate
international commitments in facilitating competition.
Such situations would include flexible negotiation
regarding the applicable criteria for ‘‘essential’’ communications services. Indeed, this has been the focus of
many policy discussions involving particular aspects of
communications service provision such as interconnection. 50 The multi-level model also facilitates the entry of
new players and innovations, where the emphasis solely
on competition would likely only favour established
industry players or strategically merged and therefore
powerful incumbents, so long as they do not threaten
competition with monopoly practices or other prohibited practices.
To demonstrate how this model would function,
we may examine how new media undertakings would
hypothetically be regulated. Where new kinds of services
involving advances in new media undertakings are introduced as a result of technological convergence and
related developments, a more technically detailed and
rigorous regulatory scheme would allow the purpose of
the services provided to guide the regulatory response.
Thus, regulators would need to determine the kinds of
services that required more rigorous regulation and protection.
Indeed, this already occurs in communications with
the interconnection and interoperability standards. This
is evident in the following excerpt in relation to its relevance to new media and Internet communications:
Since the information highway is essentially a network of
networks, interconnectivity is of great importance and
incompatible standards can delay or obviate interconnection at different levels of the information highway, for
example, between different services, between content providers and services and between alternative channels and
facilities. 51
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Nevertheless, the establishment of protections for
basic services and the provision of secure facilities should
guide regulators in making decisions as to what is appropriate to market-based considerations. Much of the present realm of broadcasting, for instance, would be suitable to greater competition. While some may argue that
Canadian content would suffer under such a lack of
regulation, this could be an area where standards for selfregulation may be developed. Similarly, many commentators have suggested that restrictions on foreign ownership serve little purpose and should therefore be
removed. 52 Such deregulation indicates an area where
competition might be appropriate. Indeed, many aspects
of what is now categorized as broadcasting are already
subject to self-regulation standards. 53 More rigorous regulation, by contrast, would be appropriate for aspects of
service provision with respect to network infrastructures,
interconnection, security services, and information
databases. With the integration of the Internet in the
regulation of communications, the assurance of protection by regulation of services based on their purposes
may therefore be extended to ensure network protection, security and interconnection.
Certain criticisms may be levelled against the multilevel model. First, the multi-layer model could be critiqued since it appears complex. Second, the flexibility of
the regulations based on the purpose of the services may
also mean that certain substantially similar activities of
service providers would be subject to different regulatory
classifications. Third, this model would also likely come
under a great deal of critical scrutiny from the U.S. if it
led to a substantially different regulatory environment
for communications undertakings than exists there.
These critiques will be addressed in turn by comparison
to the first two models.
As compared to the first two models, the multi-level
model may certainly appear more complicated, but it
would create more certainty and uniformity in the areas
where increased protection would be deemed necessary.
Furthermore, where there is a sector-specific model, yet a
dependence on the forbearance from regulation where it
is found to be appropriate, this leads to a situation where
the regulations continue to be in operation, while exceptions are made based on the purposes of the services.
This could arguably lead to an even more complex situation, where new media undertakings — as the five-year
exemption draws to a close — would be required to face
not only the growing confusion as to the difference
between the present sector-specific legislation for telecommunications and broadcasting, but would also
attempt to present themselves as appropriately forborne
from regulation. Where there was a multi-layer model,
the principles that would guide the level of protection or
regulation would be more clearly defined and lead to
greater certainty in this regard. With the second model, if
there were new media undertakings that had more general regulation to suit the converged environment, this
may solve the problem of the grey area between carriage
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and content, but the move toward deregulation and
greater reliance upon competition indicates that there
would likely be a lack of regulation where some may be
warranted. If competition law becomes the sole arbiter
when problems arise, it could lead to a situation where
new media undertakings would be deterred by the
power held by a market-controlled communications
field. 54
The second critique concerns the application of different regulations to different sets of services by the same
service provider. The complexity of this scenario nonetheless seems preferable to the present sector-specific regulatory model, with its increasing grey area between
broadcasting and telecommunications, and the necessity
to apply for forbearance from regulation on a case-bycase basis. This forbearance may be granted, withheld, or
may be limited to only particular aspects of the operation of the provision of communications services. Indeed,
there is already uncertainty and unpredictability in the
present legislative environment with respect to new
media and certain convergent service providers that
could lead to a complex variety of applications of regulation — or non-regulation, depending on the results of a
forbearance decision, or the determination on the applications of either the telecommunications or the broadcasting regulations. This has been addressed by commentary on the consequences of convergence in
Canadian communications regulation:
Technological convergence raises myriad competitive issues
that either add to or amplify those raised in the traditional
vertical sectors. It disrupts the conceptual separation
between the regulated industries at the centre of convergence — telecommunications and broadcasting — whose
regulators have often been unmindful of the competitive
impacts of developments in other sectors. For the same
reason, convergence also creates the risk of inconsistent regulation. Technology-neutral legislation may extend telecommunications and broadcasting regulation to the converging
industries indiscriminately, or for different reasons. Alternatively, like services may be excluded from regulation. Conflicts are aggravated with respect both to convergence as a
broad phenomenon, and to specific convergence technologies such as Internet telephony, Web broadcasting and content portals. 55

In the second model, fewer problems would arise
for new media since whichever more generalized principles guide such new regulations, they would likely be
adequate. Thus, there would likely be more clear direction in regulation with the development of specific regulations for communications services in a converged environment; however, to the extent that these rules will
likely be rudimentary and encourage competition, there
will not be a great deal of opportunity for specific regulations to be developed to protect the more essential features of communications infrastructures and security.
The third critique involves the reaction and influence of the United States with respect to the development of Canadian communications regulations. It
should be noted that the U.S. is often an influential
policy maker; this influence is made even greater due to
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the trade agreements between Canada and the U.S. as
well as the recent WTO agreement with respect to trade
in telecommunications. 56 However, Canada and the
United States have always differed to a certain extent in
the regulation of telecommunications and broadcasting.
Indeed, it may be argued that there would likely be
similar results in the multi-level model as compared to
using the sector-specific model, forbearance, and finally
the reliance upon competition. With the multi-layer
model, however, there would simply be a mechanism by
which communications and new media undertakings
may anticipate the regulations that would be applicable
to the particular aspects of their services. Furthermore,
there would be a greater protection for the provision of
essential services without the necessity of relying upon
the interplay of various limitative rules.
In the final analysis, the multi-level regulatory
scheme should be assessed according to its success in
accommodating the technological, economic, public
interest, and socio-political influences. This regulatory
framework certainly suits technological advancements, as
the type of regulation would depend upon the nature of
the particular services. The model is therefore purposespecific rather than sector-specific, which permits greater
flexibility in its application to both the old, traditional
communications technologies as well as the innovative
new communications technologies and new media
undertakings. The flexibility of the multi-level model
creates an approach that may be used in different jurisdictions, with the particular aspects of the legislation
crafted to suit the particular balance of pertinent considerations that take precedence in the given jurisdiction. If
the four fundamental considerations are kept in mind, as
well as the regard to the basic purpose of the particular
communications technology application that is regulated, the purpose-specific model would suit the requirements of the various perspectives and regulatory jurisdictions, in contrast to the polarized models that
accommodate either the market-based regimes or the
schemes that are determined solely by the public
interest.
With respect to economic influences, the multi-level
model provides a moderate and balanced solution for
the advocates of competition in the telecommunications,
broadcasting and converged media sectors. By allowing
competition for appropriate communications technological applications and services, this realm would be able to
develop with the reliance on the competition model that
exists at present. At the same time, rigorous regulation
and industry protection could be reserved for what
would be determined to be essential services. Indeed, it
would stand to reason that the services that were suited
to competition would benefit from the dependability
that would result from the protection and regulation of
more essential infrastructure and interconnection levels
in the provision of communications: ‘‘In the context of
convergence, regulatory stability will also be essential in
ensuring that the risks encountered by investors are lim-
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ited to those inherent in addressing the associated
embryonic markets’’. 57
Broader public interest concerns could be better
protected by the proposed multi-level model since there
is no guarantee, either when there has been forbearance
from regulation or when competition or intellectual
property law is left to govern the field, that public
interest concerns would be accommodated. The public
interest concerns, which range from policy considerations presently relevant to telecommunications and
broadcasting such as universal access to Canadian identity, could be preserved in the regulation of particular,
directed aspects of the provided services. Finally, sociopolitical concerns could be addressed by purpose-specific
regulation, since protection for the security of Canadian
databases and information security as well as the infrastructure that provides the basic infrastructure for services provided in Canada could be controlled in the
specific context of protection and security.

Conclusion

W

hen the CRTC announced that it would refrain
from regulating broadcasting in new media for a
period of five years, this occasion illustrated the
increasing inapplicability of the sector-specific legislation
from which the mandate of the CRTC is derived. The
purpose-specific, multi-level model for the regulation of
communications technologies proposed by this paper
offers a coherent alternative to the current trend toward
the governance of communications technologies by
competition law. The purpose-specific model also best
responds to the technological, economic, public interest
and socio-political considerations, the balance of which
should be considered a guide for adjudicating policy
modifications in such significant industries as communications technologies. While technological and economic
changes have been the most influential factors in stimulating recent policy and regulatory re-evaluation in
Canada with respect to telecommunications and broadcasting regulation, public interest and socio-political concerns should remain significant in the design of new
regulatory and policy responses to convergence and
competition. The increasingly essential nature of services
provided by and established upon communications
technologies and new media require that their governance have sound theoretical and rational policy foundations rather than the simple regulation by default.

Appendix 1
Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11
Broadcasting Policy for Canada
Sec. 3. Declaration. (1) It is hereby declared as the broadcasting policy for Canada that

Regulatory Models in Communications Law

(a) the Canadian broadcasting system shall be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians;
(b) the Canadian broadcasting system, operating primarily in the English and French languages and
comprising public, private and community elements, makes use of radio frequencies that are
public property and provides, through its programming, a public service essential to the maintenance
and enhancement of national identity and cultural
sovereignty;
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(v) include a significant contribution from the
Canadian independent production sector;
(j) educational programming, particularly where provided through the facilities of an independent educational authority, is an integral part of the Canadian broadcasting system;
(k) a range of broadcasting services in English and in
French shall be extended to all Canadians as
resources become available;

(d) the Canadian broadcasting system should

(l) the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, as the
national public broadcaster, should provide radio
and television services incorporating a wide range of
programming that informs, enlightens and entertains;

(ii) encourage the development of Canadian
expression by providing a wide range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes,
opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity, by
displaying Canadian talent in entertainment
programming and by offering information
and analysis concerning Canada and other
countries from a Canadian point of view,
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(iv) provide a reasonable opportunity for the
public to be exposed to the expression of differing views on matters of public concern, and

(c) English and French language broadcasting, while
sharing common aspects, operate under different
conditions and may have different requirements;
(i) serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the
cultural, political, social and economic fabric of
Canada,

✄ REMOVE

109

(iii) through its programming and the employment opportunities arising out of its operations, serve the needs and interests, and reflect
the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men, women and children, including
equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian
society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that society, and
(iv) be readily adaptable to scientific and technological change;
(e) each element of the Canadian broadcasting system
shall contribute in an appropriate manner to the
creation and presentation of Canadian programming;
(f) each broadcasting undertaking shall make maximum use, and in no case less than predominant
use, of Canadian creative and other resources in the
creation and presentation of programming, unless
the nature of the service provided by the undertaking, such as specialized content or format or the
use of languages other than French and English,
renders that use impracticable, in which case the
undertaking shall make the greatest practicable use
of those resources;
(g) the programming originated by broadcasting
undertakings should be of high standard;
(h) all persons who are licensed to carry on broadcasting undertakings have a responsibility for the
programs they broadcast;
(i) the programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system should
(i) be varied and comprehensive, providing a balance of information, enlightenment and
entertainment for men, women and children of
all ages, interests and tastes,
(ii) be drawn from local, regional, national and
international sources,
(iii) include educational and community programs,

(m) the programming provided by the Corporation
should
(i) be predominantly and distinctively Canadian,
(ii) reflect Canada and its regions to national and
regional audiences, while serving the special
needs of those regions,
(iii) actively contribute to the flow and exchange
of cultural expression,
(iv) be in English and in French, reflecting the
different needs and circumstances of each official language community, including the particular needs and circumstances of English
and French linguistic minorities,
(v) strive to be of equivalent quality in English and
in French,
(vi) contribute to shared national consciousness
and identity,
(vii) be made available throughout Canada by the
most appropriate and efficient means and as
resources become available for the purpose,
and
(viii) reflect the multicultural and multiracial
nature of Canada;
(n) where any conflict arises between the objectives of
the Corporation set out in paragraphs (l) and (m)
and the interests of any other broadcasting undertaking of the Canadian broadcasting system, it shall
be resolved in the public interest, and where the
public interest would be equally served by resolving
the conflict in favour of either, it shall be resolved
in favour of the objectives set out in paragraphs (l)
and (m);
(o) programming that reflects the aboriginal cultures of
Canada should be provided within the Canadian
broadcasting system as resources become available
for the purpose;
(p) programming accessible by disabled persons should
be provided within the Canadian broadcasting
system as resources become available for the purpose;
(q) without limiting any obligation of a broadcasting
undertaking to provide the programming contemplated by paragraph (i), alternative television programming services in English and in French should
be provided where necessary to ensure that the full
range of programming contemplated by that para-
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graph is made available through the Canadian
broadcasting system;
(r) the programming provided by alternative television
programming services should
(i) be innovative and be complementary to the
programming provided for mass audiences,
(ii) cater to tastes and interests not adequately provided for by the programming provided for
mass audiences, and include programming
devoted to culture and the arts,
(iii) reflect Canada’s regions and multicultural
nature,
(iv) as far as possible, be acquired rather than produced by those services, and
(v) be made available throughout Canada by the
most cost-efficient means;
(s) private networks and programming undertakings
should, to an extent consistent with the financial
and other resources available to them,
(i) contribute significantly to the creation and
presentation of Canadian programming, and
(ii) be responsive to the evolving demands of the
public; and
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(t) distribution undertakings
(i) should give priority to the carriage of Canadian
programming services and, in particular, to the
carriage of local Canadian stations,
(ii) should provide efficient delivery of programming at affordable rates, using the most effective technologies available at reasonable cost,
(iii) should, where programming services are supplied to them by broadcasting undertakings
pursuant to contractual arrangements, provide
reasonable terms for the carriage, packaging
and retailing of those programming services,
and
(iv) may, where the Commission considers it
appropriate, originate programming,
including local programming, on such terms
as are conducive to the achievement of the
objectives of the broadcasting policy set out in
this subsection, and in particular provide
access for underserved linguistic and cultural
minority communities.
(2) Further declaration. It is further declared that the
Canadian broadcasting system constitutes a single system
and that the objectives of the broadcasting policy set out in
subsection (1) can best be achieved by providing for the
regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting
system by a single independent public authority.
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Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-22 [hereinafter CRTCA]. See discussion in S. Handa et al.,

The objectives of the Canadian Telecommunications Policy are set forth
in s. 7 as follows:
It is hereby affirmed that telecommunications performs an essential
role in the maintenance of Canada’s identity and sovereignty and
that the Canadian telecommunications policy has as its objectives
(a) to facilitate the orderly development throughout Canada of
a telecommunications system that serves to safeguard, enrich and
strengthen the social and economic fabric of Canada and its regions;

See L.-L. Christians, ‘‘Convergence and Proceduralisation: Generalisation
vs. Contextualisation?’’ (1998) 22 Telecom. Pol’y 255 at 257:
Faced with the new overlapping due to the phenomenon of convergence, regulation, rather than denying complexity by a discourse of
pure generalisation, must be given the means for a real pluridisciplinarity, that is to say, for an articulation among the three poles,
economic, democratic and technological, reflected not as theoretical
and formal juxtaposition but as a true osmosis, within which no
pole has a pre-established rational priority. The problems linked to
this complex intertwining can only be effectively apprehended on
condition of being collectively reconstructed beforehand in the
enlarged field of all the interested parties. In this way, concretely, we
can revise the regulation of content, certainly by abandoning any
substantive conception of the general interest or of what is, for
example, to be suppressed as ‘‘pornography’’, but also by reconstructing deliberative procedures which allow these questions to be
posed and resolved without it being a question again of opposing
sex chatlines, pornographic magazines or broadcasts by giving
whatever technological or economic diktat as an excuse. This collective reconstruction must be democratically inscribed in the particular mechanisms enabling all the interested actors, with regard to
which the mechanical increase in curbs on market supply and
demand is insufficient.
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Communications Law in Canada (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2000) at
para. 3.39.

It would appear that Third World nations will bear the brunt of the
risk and instability associated with the exploitation of information
industry technologies and markets. As producers in the periphery,
they will have little, if any, control over the product or profit from
their labor and other resources. Moreover, successful global marketing by the TNCs requires that Third World leaders be convinced
to import the latest computer/telecommunications systems.
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Kane, T.G., ‘‘Recent Case Law, Regulatory and Policy Developments in the Canadian Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors’’ online: Lexpert Articles on Recent Legal
Developments (2000) http://www.lexpert.ca (date accessed:
22 April 2002).

(b) to render reliable and affordable telecommunications services of high quality accessible to Canadians in both urban and rural
areas in all regions of Canada;
(c) to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness, at the
national and international levels, of Canadian telecommunications;
(d) to promote the ownership and control of Canadian carriers
by Canadians;
(e) to promote the use of Canadian transmission facilities for
telecommunications within Canada and between Canada and
points outside Canada;
(f) to foster increased reliance on market forces for the provision
of telecommunications services and to ensure that regulation, where
required, is efficient and effective;
(g) to stimulate research and development in Canada in the
field of telecommunications and to encourage innovation in the
provision of telecommunications services;
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